عدد المساهمات : 115
تاريخ التسجيل : 02/06/2010
العمر : 49
|موضوع: تقرير مجمد البرادعى يشأن العراق المقدم لمجلس الأمن فى فبراير 2003 21/6/2010, 4:44 pm|| |
Statements of the Director General
14 February 2003 | New York, USA
Statement to the United Nations Security Council
The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the IAEA's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions. Less than three weeks have passed since my last update to the Council, on 27 January - a relatively short period in the overall inspection process. However, I believe it is important for the Council to remain actively engaged and fully informed at this crucial time.
Current Inspection Activities: Still Building Capacity
The focus of the IAEA's inspections has now moved from the "reconnaissance
phase" into the "investigative phase". The "reconnaissance phase" was aimed at re-establishing rapidly our knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, ensuring that nuclear activities at known key facilities had not been resumed, verifying the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, and identifying the current workplaces of former key Iraqi personnel. The focus of the "investigative phase" is achieving an understanding of Iraq's activities over the last four years, in particular in areas identified by States as being of concern and those identified by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis.
Since our 27 January report, the IAEA has conducted an additional 38 inspections at 19 locations, for a total of 177 inspections at 125 locations. Iraq
has continued to provide immediate access to all locations. In the course of the inspections, we have identified certain facilities at which we will be re-establishing containment and surveillance systems in order to monitor, on a continuous basis, activities associated with critical dual-use equipment. At this time, we are using recurrent inspections to ensure that this equipment is not being used for prohibited purposes.
As I mentioned in my last report to the Council, we have a number of wide-area
and location-specific measures for detecting indications of undeclared past or ongoing nuclear activities in Iraq, including environmental sampling and radiation detection surveys.
In this regard, we have been collecting a broad variety of samples, including water, sediment and vegetation, at inspected facilities and at other locations across Iraq, and analysing them for signatures of nuclear activities.
We have also resumed air sampling at key locations in Iraq. Three of the four air samplers that were removed in December 2002 for refurbishing have been returned to Iraq. One of these has been installed at a fixed location, and the other two are being operated from mobile platforms.
We are intending to increase their number to make optimum use of this technique.
We are also continuing to expand the use of hand-held and
surveys in Iraq. The gamma survey vehicle has been used en route
sites and within sites, as well as in urban and industrial
areas. We will
start helicopter-borne gamma surveys as soon as the relevant
receives its final certification for use on the helicopter model
to us for use in Iraq.
Conduct of Interviews
The IAEA has continued to interview key Iraqi personnel. We have
been able to conduct four interviews in private - that is,
presence of an Iraqi observer. The interviewees, however, have
their interviews. In addition, discussions have continued to be
with Iraqi technicians and officials as part of inspection
and technical meetings. I should note that, during our recent
in Baghdad, Iraq reconfirmed its commitment to encourage its
to accept interviews in private, both inside and outside of
In response to a request by the IAEA, Iraq has expanded the
list of relevant
Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with their current work
The list includes the higher-level key scientists known to the
the nuclear and nuclear related areas. We will continue,
however, to ask
for information about Iraqi personnel of lesser rank whose work
of significance to our mandate.
I would like now to provide an update on a number of specific
that we are currently pursuing. I should mention that, shortly
our recent meeting in Baghdad, and based on our discussions with
counterpart, Iraq provided documentation related to these
reported attempt to import uranium, the attempted procurement of
tubes, the procurement of magnets and magnet production
the use of HMX, and those questions and concerns that were
in 1998. I will touch briefly on each of these issues.
Iraq continues to state that it has made no attempt to import
since the 1980s. The IAEA recently received some additional
relevant to this issue, which will be further pursued, hopefully
the assistance of the African country reported to have been
The IAEA is continuing to follow up on acknowledged efforts by
import high strength aluminium tubes. As you will know, Iraq has
these efforts to have been in connection with a programme to
conventional rockets. The IAEA has verified that Iraq had indeed
manufacturing such rockets. However, we are still exploring
tubes were intended rather for the manufacture of centrifuges
enrichment. In connection with this investigation, Iraq has been
to explain the reasons for the tight tolerance specifications
had requested from various suppliers. Iraq has provided
related to the project for reverse engineering and has committed
to providing samples of tubes received from prospective
will continue to investigate the matter further.
In response to IAEA inquiries about Iraq's attempts to procure a
for the manufacture of magnets, and the possible link with the
of a nuclear programme, Iraq recently provided additional
which we are presently examining.
In the course of an inspection conducted in connection with the
tube investigation, IAEA inspectors found a number of documents
to transactions aimed at the procurement of carbon fibre, a
used by Iraq in its past clandestine uranium enrichment
the manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our review of these
suggests that the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was not intended
purposes, as the specifications of the material appear not to be
with those needed for manufacturing rotor tubes. In addition, we
carried out follow-up inspections, during which we have been
able to observe
the use of such carbon fibre in non-nuclear-related applications
take samples. The IAEA will nevertheless continue to pursue this
Use of HMX
The IAEA has continued to investigate the relocation and
the high explosive HMX. As I reported earlier, Iraq has declared
32 tonnes of the HMX previously under IAEA seal had been
use in the production of industrial explosives, primarily to
as a booster for explosives used in quarrying.
Iraq has provided us with additional information, including
on the movement and use of this material, and inspections have
at locations where the material is said to have been used.
the nature of the use of high explosives, it may well be that
will be unable to reach a final conclusion on the end use of
While we have no indication that this material was used for any
other than that declared by Iraq, we have no technical method of
quantitatively, the declared use of the material in explosions.
continue to follow this issue through a review of civilian
in Iraq and through interviews of key Iraqi personnel involved
relevant research and development activities.
The IAEA has completed a more detailed review of the 2000 pages
found on 16 January at the private residence of an Iraqi
documents relate predominantly to lasers, including the use of
to enrich uranium. They consist of technical reports; minutes of
(including those of the Standing Committee for Laser
notes; copies of publications and student research project
a number of administrative documents, some of which were marked
While the documents have provided some additional details about
laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities
already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of
in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the
the conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the
Iraq's laser enrichment programme. We nevertheless continue to
to Iraq that it should search for and provide all documents,
or otherwise, that might be relevant to our mandate.
Remaining Questions and Concerns
Last week, Iraq also provided the IAEA with documentation
related to questions
and concerns that, since 1998, have been in need of further
particularly as regards weapon and centrifuge design. However,
information was contained in this documentation.
It is to be hoped that the new Iraqi commissions established
to look for any additional documents and hardware relevant to
for weapons of mass destruction will be able to uncover
other evidence that could assist in clarifying these remaining
and concerns as well as other areas of current concern.
Finally, I was informed this morning by the Director General of
National Monitoring Directorate that national legislation
proscribed activities was adopted today. The resolution of this
legal matter was a step in the right direction for Iraq to
its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Security
In the coming weeks, the IAEA will continue to expand its
capabilities in a number of ways, including its already
of unannounced inspections at all relevant sites in Iraq. To
and accelerate our ability to investigate matters of concern,
and to reinstate
and reinforce our ongoing monitoring and verification system
to a halt in 1998, we intend to increase the number of
support staff. We will also be adding more analysts and
support analysis of documents and other inspection findings. We
to augment the number of customs and procurement experts for the
of imports by Iraq. We will also intensify and expand the range
meetings and private interviews with Iraqi personnel, in
our preferred modalities and locations, both inside and outside
In addition, we intend to expand our capabilities for
monitoring of dual-use equipment and related activities, and
several additional components of wide area environmental
at identifying fingerprints left by nuclear material and nuclear
We hope to continue to receive from States actionable
to our mandate. Now that Iraq has accepted the use of all of the
for aerial surveillance proposed by supporting States to UNMOVIC
IAEA, including U2s, Mirage IVs, Antonovs and drones, we plan to
use of them to support our inspection activities, in particular
view to monitoring movements in and around sites to be
The Government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to
with its Security Council obligations and to provide full and
with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq making good
commitment, the above measures will contribute to the
the inspection process.
As I have reported on numerous occasions, the IAEA concluded, by
1998, that it had neutralized Iraq's past nuclear programme and
therefore, there were no unresolved disarmament issues left at
Hence, our focus since the resumption of our inspections in
and a half months ago, has been verifying whether Iraq revived
programme in the intervening years.
We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear
related activities in Iraq. However, as I have just indicated, a
of issues are still under investigation and we are not yet in a
to reach a conclusion about them, although we are moving forward
regard to some of them. To that end, we intend to make full use
authority granted to us under all relevant Security Council
to build as much capacity into the inspection process as
In that context, I would underline the importance of
States may be able to provide to help us in assessing the
completeness of the information provided by Iraq.
The IAEA's experience in nuclear verification shows that it is
particularly with an intrusive verification system, to assess
or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in a State even
full co-operation of the inspected state. However, prompt, full
co-operation by Iraq, as required under resolution
1441, will speed up the process. But more importantly, it
us to reach the high degree of assurance required by the
in the case of Iraq, in view of its past clandestine programmes
of mass destruction and past pattern of cooperation. It is my
the commitments made recently in Baghdad will continue to
concrete and sustained action.
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