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 تقرير مجمد البرادعى يشأن العراق المقدم لمجلس الأمن فى فبراير 2003

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مُساهمةموضوع: تقرير مجمد البرادعى يشأن العراق المقدم لمجلس الأمن فى فبراير 2003   21/6/2010, 4:44 pm

Statements of the Director General
14 February 2003 | New York, USA
Statement to the United Nations Security Council

The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003
Update

by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the IAEA's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions. Less than three weeks have passed since my last update to the Council, on 27 January - a relatively short period in the overall inspection process. However, I believe it is important for the Council to remain actively engaged and fully informed at this crucial time.
Current Inspection Activities: Still Building Capacity

The focus of the IAEA's inspections has now moved from the "reconnaissance
phase" into the "investigative phase". The "reconnaissance phase" was aimed at re-establishing rapidly our knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, ensuring that nuclear activities at known key facilities had not been resumed, verifying the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, and identifying the current workplaces of former key Iraqi personnel. The focus of the "investigative phase" is achieving an understanding of Iraq's activities over the last four years, in particular in areas identified by States as being of concern and those identified by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis.
Inspections
Since our 27 January report, the IAEA has conducted an additional 38 inspections at 19 locations, for a total of 177 inspections at 125 locations. Iraq
has continued to provide immediate access to all locations. In the course of the inspections, we have identified certain facilities at which we will be re-establishing containment and surveillance systems in order to monitor, on a continuous basis, activities associated with critical dual-use equipment. At this time, we are using recurrent inspections to ensure that this equipment is not being used for prohibited purposes.
Technical Methods
As I mentioned in my last report to the Council, we have a number of wide-area
and location-specific measures for detecting indications of undeclared past or ongoing nuclear activities in Iraq, including environmental sampling and radiation detection surveys.
In this regard, we have been collecting a broad variety of samples, including water, sediment and vegetation, at inspected facilities and at other locations across Iraq, and analysing them for signatures of nuclear activities.
We have also resumed air sampling at key locations in Iraq. Three of the four air samplers that were removed in December 2002 for refurbishing have been returned to Iraq. One of these has been installed at a fixed location, and the other two are being operated from mobile platforms.
We are intending to increase their number to make optimum use of this technique.



We are also continuing to expand the use of hand-held and
car-borne gamma
surveys in Iraq. The gamma survey vehicle has been used en route
to inspection
sites and within sites, as well as in urban and industrial
areas. We will
start helicopter-borne gamma surveys as soon as the relevant
equipment
receives its final certification for use on the helicopter model
provided
to us for use in Iraq.



Conduct of Interviews
The IAEA has continued to interview key Iraqi personnel. We have
recently
been able to conduct four interviews in private - that is,
without the
presence of an Iraqi observer. The interviewees, however, have
tape recorded
their interviews. In addition, discussions have continued to be
conducted
with Iraqi technicians and officials as part of inspection
activities
and technical meetings. I should note that, during our recent
meeting
in Baghdad, Iraq reconfirmed its commitment to encourage its
citizens
to accept interviews in private, both inside and outside of
Iraq.


In response to a request by the IAEA, Iraq has expanded the
list of relevant
Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with their current work
locations.
The list includes the higher-level key scientists known to the
IAEA in
the nuclear and nuclear related areas. We will continue,
however, to ask
for information about Iraqi personnel of lesser rank whose work
may be
of significance to our mandate.


Specific Issues


I would like now to provide an update on a number of specific
issues
that we are currently pursuing. I should mention that, shortly
before
our recent meeting in Baghdad, and based on our discussions with
the Iraqi
counterpart, Iraq provided documentation related to these
issues: the
reported attempt to import uranium, the attempted procurement of
aluminium
tubes, the procurement of magnets and magnet production
capabilities,
the use of HMX, and those questions and concerns that were
outstanding
in 1998. I will touch briefly on each of these issues.


Uranium Acquisition
Iraq continues to state that it has made no attempt to import
uranium
since the 1980s. The IAEA recently received some additional
information
relevant to this issue, which will be further pursued, hopefully
with
the assistance of the African country reported to have been
involved.



Uranium Enrichment
The IAEA is continuing to follow up on acknowledged efforts by
Iraq to
import high strength aluminium tubes. As you will know, Iraq has
declared
these efforts to have been in connection with a programme to
reverse engineer
conventional rockets. The IAEA has verified that Iraq had indeed
been
manufacturing such rockets. However, we are still exploring
whether the
tubes were intended rather for the manufacture of centrifuges
for uranium
enrichment. In connection with this investigation, Iraq has been
asked
to explain the reasons for the tight tolerance specifications
that it
had requested from various suppliers. Iraq has provided
documentation
related to the project for reverse engineering and has committed
itself
to providing samples of tubes received from prospective
suppliers. We
will continue to investigate the matter further.


In response to IAEA inquiries about Iraq's attempts to procure a
facility
for the manufacture of magnets, and the possible link with the
resumption
of a nuclear programme, Iraq recently provided additional
documentation,
which we are presently examining.


In the course of an inspection conducted in connection with the
aluminium
tube investigation, IAEA inspectors found a number of documents
relevant
to transactions aimed at the procurement of carbon fibre, a
dual-use material
used by Iraq in its past clandestine uranium enrichment
programme for
the manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our review of these
documents
suggests that the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was not intended
for enrichment
purposes, as the specifications of the material appear not to be
consistent
with those needed for manufacturing rotor tubes. In addition, we
have
carried out follow-up inspections, during which we have been
able to observe
the use of such carbon fibre in non-nuclear-related applications
and to
take samples. The IAEA will nevertheless continue to pursue this
matter.


Use of HMX
The IAEA has continued to investigate the relocation and
consumption of
the high explosive HMX. As I reported earlier, Iraq has declared
that
32 tonnes of the HMX previously under IAEA seal had been
transferred for
use in the production of industrial explosives, primarily to
cement plants
as a booster for explosives used in quarrying.


Iraq has provided us with additional information, including
documentation
on the movement and use of this material, and inspections have
been conducted
at locations where the material is said to have been used.
However, given
the nature of the use of high explosives, it may well be that
the IAEA
will be unable to reach a final conclusion on the end use of
this material.
While we have no indication that this material was used for any
application
other than that declared by Iraq, we have no technical method of
verifying,
quantitatively, the declared use of the material in explosions.
We will
continue to follow this issue through a review of civilian
mining practices
in Iraq and through interviews of key Iraqi personnel involved
in former
relevant research and development activities.


Laser-related Documents
The IAEA has completed a more detailed review of the 2000 pages
of documents
found on 16 January at the private residence of an Iraqi
scientist. The
documents relate predominantly to lasers, including the use of
laser technology
to enrich uranium. They consist of technical reports; minutes of
meetings
(including those of the Standing Committee for Laser
Applications); personal
notes; copies of publications and student research project
theses; and
a number of administrative documents, some of which were marked
as classified.
While the documents have provided some additional details about
Iraq's
laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities
or sites
already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of
the scientist
in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the
documents alters
the conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the
extent of
Iraq's laser enrichment programme. We nevertheless continue to
emphasize
to Iraq that it should search for and provide all documents,
personal
or otherwise, that might be relevant to our mandate.


Remaining Questions and Concerns
Last week, Iraq also provided the IAEA with documentation
related to questions
and concerns that, since 1998, have been in need of further
clarification,
particularly as regards weapon and centrifuge design. However,
no new
information was contained in this documentation.


It is to be hoped that the new Iraqi commissions established
by Iraq
to look for any additional documents and hardware relevant to
its programmes
for weapons of mass destruction will be able to uncover
documents and
other evidence that could assist in clarifying these remaining
questions
and concerns as well as other areas of current concern.


Finally, I was informed this morning by the Director General of
Iraq's
National Monitoring Directorate that national legislation
prohibiting
proscribed activities was adopted today. The resolution of this
long-standing
legal matter was a step in the right direction for Iraq to
demonstrate
its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Security
Council's
resolutions.



Looking Ahead


In the coming weeks, the IAEA will continue to expand its
inspection
capabilities in a number of ways, including its already
extensive use
of unannounced inspections at all relevant sites in Iraq. To
strengthen
and accelerate our ability to investigate matters of concern,
and to reinstate
and reinforce our ongoing monitoring and verification system
that came
to a halt in 1998, we intend to increase the number of
inspectors and
support staff. We will also be adding more analysts and
translators to
support analysis of documents and other inspection findings. We
intend
to augment the number of customs and procurement experts for the
monitoring
of imports by Iraq. We will also intensify and expand the range
of technical
meetings and private interviews with Iraqi personnel, in
accordance with
our preferred modalities and locations, both inside and outside
Iraq.


In addition, we intend to expand our capabilities for
near-real-time
monitoring of dual-use equipment and related activities, and
implement
several additional components of wide area environmental
monitoring aimed
at identifying fingerprints left by nuclear material and nuclear
related
activities.


We hope to continue to receive from States actionable
information relevant
to our mandate. Now that Iraq has accepted the use of all of the
platforms
for aerial surveillance proposed by supporting States to UNMOVIC
and the
IAEA, including U2s, Mirage IVs, Antonovs and drones, we plan to
make
use of them to support our inspection activities, in particular
with a
view to monitoring movements in and around sites to be
inspected.


The Government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to
comply
with its Security Council obligations and to provide full and
active co-operation
with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq making good
on this
commitment, the above measures will contribute to the
effectiveness of
the inspection process.





Conclusion



As I have reported on numerous occasions, the IAEA concluded, by
December
1998, that it had neutralized Iraq's past nuclear programme and
that,
therefore, there were no unresolved disarmament issues left at
that time.
Hence, our focus since the resumption of our inspections in
Iraq, two
and a half months ago, has been verifying whether Iraq revived
its nuclear
programme in the intervening years.


We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear
or nuclear
related activities in Iraq. However, as I have just indicated, a
number
of issues are still under investigation and we are not yet in a
position
to reach a conclusion about them, although we are moving forward
with
regard to some of them. To that end, we intend to make full use
of the
authority granted to us under all relevant Security Council
resolutions
to build as much capacity into the inspection process as
necessary.


In that context, I would underline the importance of
information that
States may be able to provide to help us in assessing the
accuracy and
completeness of the information provided by Iraq.


The IAEA's experience in nuclear verification shows that it is
possible,
particularly with an intrusive verification system, to assess
the presence
or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in a State even
without the
full co-operation of the inspected state. However, prompt, full
and active
co-operation by Iraq, as required under resolution

1441, will speed up the process. But more importantly, it
will enable
us to reach the high degree of assurance required by the
Security Council
in the case of Iraq, in view of its past clandestine programmes
of weapons
of mass destruction and past pattern of cooperation. It is my
hope that
the commitments made recently in Baghdad will continue to
translate into
concrete and sustained action.



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تقرير مجمد البرادعى يشأن العراق المقدم لمجلس الأمن فى فبراير 2003
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